BETWEEN HEAVEN AND EARTH:

DUAL ACCOUNTABILITY OF CHINESE BUREAUCRATS

IN THE EAST HAN DYNASTY[1]

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Abstract: From the Qin up to the Qing Dynasties, officials appointed by the central government in imperial China were not only beholden to their superiors but also acted as brokers for local interests. We characterize such a structural position as having "dual accountability." Although accountability to superiors is readily understandable within the Weberian framework of bureaucratic hierarchy, the reasons behind local accountability needs an explanation. This paper attempts to explain how officials worked for their regional interests by analyzing the dual accountability in the East Han Dynasty (25-220 AD). By investigating the larger contexts of the government structure, political ideology, and personnel system of the time, we offer three explanations in this paper: practical necessity, "Confucian" ideology, and reputational mechanism. These explanations have each been supported by empirical evidence from multiple sources, including administrative records and inscriptions on ancient stelae. In addition, we question Weber's analysis of the Chinese imperial governing system and present new ideas about the social rationality underlying an "inefficient" system that was in place for two millennia.

Keywords: Chinese bureaucracy, Han Dynasty, Imperial China, Confucianism, local accountability

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A field commander must decide even against the king's orders.
--A Chinese proverb

I. Theoretical Issues

In one of the most influential early European accounts of China, Jean-Baptiste du Halde (1674-1743) remarked, “One cannot help being surprised to see a people infinitely numerous, naturally unquiet, self-interested even to excess, and always endeavoring to be rich, nevertheless governed and kept within the bounds of their duty by a small number of Mandarins” (Du Halde, 1741: II. 32). To be sure, Du Halde was commenting upon the situation during his own lifetime in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, yet he indeed raised an important theoretical issue: how had such an immense population been governed successfully by a small state for the over two millennia since the Qin dynasty? In fact, this question has intrigued generations of Western scholars (Chang 1955; De Crespigny 1981, 1995; Esherick and Rankin 1990; Finer, 1999 [1997]; Hsiao 1960; Hsu 1976; Loewe 1967, 2004; Kuhn 2002; Mann 1986; Min 1989; Reed 2000; Shue 1988; Watt 1972; Weber 1951, 1978; Wittfogel 1957).

The challenge of governing China can be illustrated using the Han dynasty (206 BCE - 220 CE) as a case in point. In many regards, the Han period represents an ideal point of departure, as this was when most of the foundations of the imperial system were laid. Although the size of Han territory at its height pales in comparison to that of the Mongol Yuan (1279-1368) or Manchu Qing (1644-1911) empires, it was nevertheless vast. Han territory encompassed portions of Central Asia, Vietnam, and North Korea, as well as much of what is now China proper (Loewe 1986: 166-167).

Indeed, the difficulty of governing Han China may be characterized by what Herbert Simon (1954:95) calls “the problem of control” in large-scale organizations. By Simon’s account, problems of control stem from the fact that those who legitimately control it cannot cope with its size. As Simon writes, “They have time neither to find out in detail what is going on nor to decide what should go on.” As a result, the legitimate controllers (superiors) must delegate authority to others--the “designated controllers.” But delegating authority creates problems of its own. More often than not, designated controllers will take matters into their own hands and further their own interests, even at the cost of undercutting the aims of the legitimate controllers.

Of course, all this is familiar to scholars of Han administration. Given the size of Han territory, the emperor and his senior ministers (or “legitimate controllers”) had to delegate their authority to administrators (“designated controllers”), many of whom were stationed in remote corners of the empire. Limitations of technology and communication further encumbered the ability of the capital to know about possible abuses of power. Although Han rulers instituted a system of checks and balances within the bureaucracy, the situation nevertheless led to conflicts of interest between the capital and the administrators. Given these conditions, the fact that imperial regimes, including the Han, governed at all remains something of a puzzle (Balazs 1964; Ch’ü 1988 [1962]; De Crespigny 1966; De Crespigny 1981; De Crespigny 1995; Bielenstein 1980; Kiser and Tong 1992; Hamilton 1989; Hsiao 1960; Shue 1988; Wang 1949 cf. Chang 1955;

Weber 1978).

In his pioneering work on bureaucracy, Max Weber furnished an influential account of how imperial rulers governed China. In *Religions of China* and *Economy and Society*, he argued that China was governed *in spite* of its inefficient institutions, many of which made the central state ineffective (Weber, 1951, 1978). "Until recently, subordinate authorities commonly considered the decrees of the central government as ethical and authoritative proposals or desires rather than orders" (Weber, 1951: 49). Such weakness, he argued, reflected the fact that the court "failed to establish a precise and unified administration," for example, using a system of recruitment based on technical qualifications (Weber, 1951: 47-49, 56-60; Weber, 1978: 1028). In his view, concrete measures used by rulers for control – such as brief tenures in office, rules excluding officials from serving in their native areas, and surveillance by inspectors – were ineffective (Weber, 1978: 1048; Weber, 1951: 48). To be sure, Weber did not see these problems as uniquely Chinese. On the contrary, they were typical of "all far flung patrimonial states with underdeveloped techniques of communication" (Weber, 1951: 47). If anything, these problems were only especially marked in imperial China because its system of rule came the closest to approximating the ideal type of a traditional, or patrimonial, bureaucracy (Weber, 1951: 47-60; Weber, 1978: 229-234).

According to Weber, whatever effectiveness there was to imperial rule owed much to a single social value --, filial piety (*xiao*) – which made up for the lack of unity or efficiency within the bureaucracy (Hamilton, 1984, 1990). "Piety toward tradition and toward the master" was paramount in the Chinese system (Weber, 1978: 1008). More than a private or domestic virtue, filial piety – which called for personal subordination to the family patriarch – supposedly inculcated the population with an unconditional respect for hierarchical authority. In addition, it structured relations within the state, as it could be transferred to all relationships of subordination (Weber, 1951: 156-158; Weber, 1978: 1050).

It would be no exaggeration to say that Weber's views of the Chinese bureaucracy have been influential. Certainly, such views have shaped the work of countless scholars, including sociologist Michael Mann's *Sources of Social Power* (1986). There, Mann proposes two main dimensions of state power: "infrastructural power" (the governing capacity of a central state) and "despotic power" (the distributive power of the state elite over society). Like Weber, Mann argues that the imperial Chinese state had limited infrastructural power but strong despotic power, power that derived primarily from state ideology in imperial China or from Confucianism. Confucianism, Mann notes, reinforced the hierarchical power structure by promoting social harmony, ethical conduct, and secular education. Because of this, Confucianism represented "a marvelous instrument of imperial/class rule," enabling Chinese dynasties to govern successfully and exercise despotic power (Mann, 1986: 342-344).[2]

Weber's views of China have also been subject to criticism. To cite but a handful of examples, social historians working in the late imperial period have critiqued Weber's simplistic assumptions about the nature of elite status and power. The Chinese elite was not uniform in composition, as Weber thought, nor did it necessarily rule by virtue of its connection to the

[2] The hierarchical structure of the imperial bureaucracy was widely accepted by earlier generations of China scholars. This was evident in Karl Wittfogel's 1957 book, *Oriental Despotism*, where it is argued that order was maintained in China by "total submission" (p. 149) and "total obedience" (p.151) within the confines of a "monopoly bureaucracy" (p. 367). Similarly, Étienne Balazs (1964) asserted that the "cohesion of a vast agrarian empire" owed everything to Confucian ideology, which maintained a social hierarchy through "respectfulness, humility, deference, docility, complete submission and subordination to elders and betters" (p. 155).

imperial state (Esherick and Rankin, 1990: 2-3). In addition, Philip C. Huang (2001) and Robert Marsh (2000) have criticized Weber's reading of the Chinese legal system, arguing that Weber exaggerated the arbitrary and irrational nature of the Qing dynasty (1644-1911) legal code while overlooking the role that informal rules played in the "regularization" of law in the late imperial period. Still, Weber's works are defended by some of today's scholars (Zhao, 2006b; Andreas, 2007).

More pertinently, sociologist Gary Hamilton questions whether the imperial state was really as top-down as Weber would claim. For one thing, Hamilton argues, it is doubtful that fathers in imperial China ever enjoyed the scope of authority that Weber attributed to them. Thus, it is doubtful that filial obligation – the social virtue Weber claimed cemented the bureaucratic hierarchy – ever functioned to inculcate officials with unconditional obedience to superiors. According to Hamilton (1989: 50), this Weberian formulation misses the extent to which classical thought emphasized the *reciprocal* nature of social obligations. Filial piety called for people to do more than blindly obey their superiors; such a value also required them to submit to duties associated with executive roles, which included obligations to children, constituents, and subordinates. In addition, Hamilton argues that efficiency was never a goal for imperial rulers (Hamilton, 1989: 162).

Political scientist Vivienne Shue (1988: 104) points out that imperial rulers had no intention of achieving efficiency – or, in her terms, total control. As she puts it, Chinese rulers "did not, could not, and plainly often did not wish to, control everything." On the contrary, they accepted the necessity of local compromise and influence; and they permitted local pressure to shape the decision-making of state representatives. In this regard, Shue's account is consistent with the larger literature on China. This literature highlights the central state's limited control over the periphery while emphasizing how state representatives often broker local interests (Ch'ü 1988 [1962]; Fei 1953, p. 84; Perdue 1982; Reed 2000; Oi 1989; Tsai 2002, 2007).

Indeed, historical evidence suggests that local accountability represents a longstanding feature of the Chinese system of administration. According to the *History of the Later Han* (*Hou Hanshu*), a magistrate named Han Shao (circa 155 CE) was dispatched to a small county in the northeast, far from his home in Central China. As a result of a famine, tens of thousands of refugees poured into the area. Han Shao took pity upon them; over the protests of his deputy, he risked execution by opening the granaries to feed them. His superior later learned of his actions and shielded him from his punishment. Although Han Shao escaped punishment, he failed to advance from this modest position; sometime afterwards, however, four officials from Han Shao's area erected a stele monument to him, commemorating his bold deed (*HHS* 62/52. 2063; Wu, 1992: 218).

Had Han simply been answerable to his superiors, we would not expect him to have violated the rules by opening the granaries. In addition, insofar as he was dependent upon his superiors for promotions or resources, Han Shao should have served the interests of those at higher levels in the chain of command – even at the expense of not responding to the needs of those below. Moreover, if filial piety (and unconditional respect for authority) had been the dominant social value, Han Shao should not have won the praise of other officials, who went so far as to commemorate him with a *public* monument.

How are we to explain expressions of local accountability on the part of centrally-appointed officials? Of course, one might argue that there is nothing to explain; Han Shao's actions can be dismissed as an isolated example of altruism. Yet according to historians (Brown, 2007; Neskar,

1993; Will, 1990), recorded instances of local accountability were anything but isolated in Chinese imperial history. A similar story is told of another official, Wang Wang (fl. 58-76 CE). Wang opened the granaries without permission during a drought, and when the court learned of his actions, they were bent upon punishing him severely. Luckily for Wang, a powerful patron managed to win a timely pardon for him (*HHS* 39/29.1297). Later in the paper, we will supply more examples of Han administrators responding to local needs in different ways.

In this paper, which is more sociological than historical, we discuss what may have motivated imperial officials to broker local interests through an examination of the institutional and cultural practices of the Han dynasty.[3] Although this paper will focus on the particulars of the Han-dynasty case, we hope that our findings will pave the way for more expansive studies of the question over the long span of Chinese history. In sum, we propose three explanations.

First, local responsiveness reflected practical necessity; the limited resources of the centrally-appointed administrator made local cooperation a necessity for carrying out his obligations to the state. Second, local responsiveness owes much to the influence of classical ideology, which inculcated administrators with a moral obligation to serve the population. The third explanatory factor, the reputational mechanism, is the most fundamental of the three, as it is directly related to the promotion of officials. This was a system that made proof of exemplary virtue -- or charismatic qualifications -- the key to officialdom. In an age in which there were no hard or fast criteria for office, the administrator was dependent upon local constituents for a virtuous public reputation, and such recognition was crucial for improving the career prospects and standing of the administrator and his family.

II. Historical Context

As with all imperial dynasties until the Republican Revolution of 1911, Han rulers used a mixed system of governance known as *junxian*. This was a system of rule whereby dynastic rulers dispatched a limited number of administrators, who were not native to the area, to administer the realm on their behalf. The *junxian* system had a number of characteristics, which set it apart from other contemporary states, particularly the Roman empire. Most significant among them for our purpose was the “law of avoidance”: the prohibition of centrally-appointed administrators from serving in their home jurisdictions (Finer, [1997]1999: 498). The purpose of the law of avoidance was to prevent centrally-appointed officials from colluding with local interests (Shigeta, 1984: 351), to insure that state directives, particularly those that might come into conflict with local interests, could be implemented (Metzger, 1973: 37).

Aside from enforcing the “law of avoidance,” the Han court sought to insulate administrators from local influence by shortening their terms of office to only a few years (Ebrey 1974). In addition, the Han court deployed a corps of inspectors (*cishi*), who were to look for signs that the administrator was fraternizing with powerful local people, as well as for abuses of power or departures from protocol (Wang, 1949: 160-161; De Crespigny, 1981: 48-49). Another notable difference had to do with the role of the emperor. Whereas Roman emperors were personally involved in governance and took tours of the empire, Han emperors had fewer opportunities to interfere personally with local governance. Many of them tended to stay in the capital and relied largely on written communications for their information (Finer, [1997]1999; Weber, 1951). Besides, while militarism was a significant element in Roman Empire’s administration, the Han Empire emphasized meritocracy (Finer, [1997]1999; Weber, 1951; Mann 1986).

[3] For the example of sociological research using historical document, see: Zhao Dingxin (2006a).

Two further aspects of the Han system of administration bear explanation. First, the single term “official” may give the impression that the composition of the Han bureaucracy was homogeneous, but there was an essential distinction between commissioned and appointed officials. The former were elite officials who had received their appointments in the capital, and who were subject to the “law of avoidance” (De Crespigny, 2006: 1232). (Throughout this paper, we will refer to such officials as “administrators.”) The latter, also referred to as “sub-bureaucrats,” were appointed by commissioned officials as junior staff. These officials served directly under county and commandery administrators, normally in their home jurisdictions, or under ministers in the capital (Liao, 1998: 3).

A word about the primary sources we will be examining is in order. Aside from the standard histories, which provide information about important court debates, policies, and memorials, there are a handful of social commentaries and several thousand records of administration. In particular, the records of administration discovered at two sites - Juyan or Edsin-gol (present-day Gansu province) and Yinwan (Jiangsu) - are of special relevance to this study. The former site, known to scholars since the early twentieth century, provides records dating to the first century BCE from a military colony in the Northwest frontier (Loewe 1967). The latter, discovered by archaeologists in 1993, supplies information about local governance within the commandery of Donghai around 10 BCE (Loewe, 2004: 38, 43).

Stone monuments, which were erected in large numbers from the first century CE, represent the most important source for the political values of the Han local elite and are also of relevance to this study. To date, virtually all of the contents of 469 stone monuments have been compiled in four collections: (1) *Kandai sekkoku shûsei* (*KSS*) compiled by Nagata Hidemasa (2) *Lishi* (*LS*) compiled by Hong Kuo (1117-1184); (2) *Lixu* (*LX*) also compiled by Hong Kuo (4) and *Cai Zhonglang ji* (*CZLJ*), a compilation containing the works of the eulogist and official Cai Yong (132-192).

The 277 stele inscriptions (*bei*) of the 469 stone monuments (Brown, 2007: 140-141; Ebrey, 1980; Nagata and Zhou, 2002) represent the most important source for this study. Of these, 100 were built for the officials who had been dead, 48 for officials who were still alive by then, and the rest for divinity, historical figures and events (Brown, 2007: 106, 140). 48 steles survive with the contents of the backs of them or the stele reverse (*beiyin*). The reverses of these stelae contain information about the names, places of origin, and official status of 1677 donors (see Table 1). Stelae are particularly useful for two reasons. First, a large majority of the stelae were dedicated to individuals commemorate officials. Second, stelae largely resulted from local initiative. Members of the local elite and government would commission a eulogist—usually (but not always) a senior minister in the capital—to compose an inscription that would commemorate an individual, i.e., stele dedicatee (Brown, 2007: 48, Fig. 2. 2).

Table 1

No doubt, our sources have inherent limitations. Compared with those for the late imperial period and contemporary China, sources of Han local history are relatively thin. Like all historical data (Goldthorpe, 1991), the Han record is fragmentary. For example, the content of stone monuments has largely survived due to the efforts of Song dynasty antiquarians (960–1279) (Liu, 2005; Nylan, 2005a). Thus, our sources may carry a certain degree of selection bias (Xie, 2006). Our sources also have geographic limitations: the most ample information comes from centers of Han settlement, that is, Northeast, North Central, and Southwest China (Bielenstein, 1947; Nagata

and Zhou, 2002).

III. Practical Necessity

The first explanation for Han administrators' local responsiveness is that it reflected practical necessity; administrators were locally accommodating because it was in their own best interests. As numerous scholars of bureaucratic organizations have pointed out, *some* degree of local compromise is always inevitable (Downs, 1967; Tarrow, 1977; Wilson, 1989).[4] However, these general pronouncements could not provide historically specific explanations of local compromise and responsiveness. There are three aspects of the Chinese system of rule, to be examined below, which together foster local accountability: officials' identification with local interests, the limited reach of the imperial state, and the weak monitoring capacity of central authority.

Turning to the first factor, scholars have argued that local accommodation can be seen as a manifestation of self-interest on the part of state representatives insofar as those representatives identify with the welfare of their constituents (Tsai, 2002, 2007; Tarrow, 1977; Walder, 1986: 249; Zhou, 1989). Such a phenomenon is well documented in modern and contemporary Chinese history. For example, in her work on modern rural China in the pre-reform period, Jean Oi (1989: 115-125) shows how brigade leaders - who controlled the production teams - brokered local interests by under-reporting to the state the amount of grain collected. Their actions, we learn, can be explained by self-interest; brigade leaders were local men, and thus the economic hardships of their communities affected them.

Although this explanation has certain virtues, it does not explain the actions of *centrally-appointed* administrators in imperial times. The reach of the state was limited. The lion's share of officials in Han China – perhaps as much as 96% - were local to the areas in which they served. But commissioned officials, who were primarily responsible for administering counties and commandaries, were not. As noted above, commissioned administrators were barred from serving in their home jurisdictions for more than two millennia because of the "law of avoidance" (Ch'ü, [1962]1988; Yan, 1961).

Aside from citing the origins of administrators, scholars also argue that local responsiveness owed much to the enormous size of the administrative burden faced by centrally-appointed officials. Certainly, imperial Chinese magistrates and governors faced a higher administrative burden than their French counterparts (Esherick and Rankin, 1990: 3; Hamilton, 1989: 152; Kiser and Tong, 1992: 310). The most generous estimates of the Qing dynasty administrative burden - which counts members of the sub-bureaucracy as part of the state - is 3 government-related workers per every 10,000 people. In contrast, there were 7.5 paid workers for every 1,000 persons in the French state of the late eighteenth century. Given the situation, imperial administrators understandably became dependent on gentry cooperation (Shue, 1988: 100). In other words, local cooperation was necessary for the imperial administrator to just do his job.

For one thing, the size of the East Han administrative burden was much lighter than that of the late imperial period. We estimate that there were between 2.2 to 2.6 state representatives

[4] Interestingly, the conditions of contemporary American forest rangers resemble those of Han dynasty administrators. Like Han administrators, rangers work in remote areas, face high levels of uncertainty, require cooperation from the local population, and enjoy a high degree of autonomy from the central Washington office of Forest Services. As such, it is understandable why these rangers sometimes contravene central mandates (Kaufman, 1960: 211).

（local staff included）for every 1,000 people.[5] Although Han administrators certainly required local cooperation to carry out their obligations to the state, this did not mean that they were entirely at the mercy of local elites either. Han administrators controlled the access of the local elites to office-holding and thus had leverage that their counterparts in late imperial China did not have. For starters, governors could nominate local elites as "Filial and Incorrupt" (*xiaolian*), thereby elevating them to the elite commissioned ranks. In addition, local staff positions were controlled by magistrates and governors in the East Han, whereas members of the sub-bureaucracy acquired their posts through purchase or inheritance in late imperial China (Yan. 1961: 220ff; Kiser and Tong, 1992: 312). To be sure, one might question the leverage gained by controlling staff positions in the counties and commanderies. Yet it is worth noting that the Han men who held local staff positions were of higher status than those of late imperial times (Chen, 2003: 296-304; Ch'ü, [1962]1988: 62; Watt, 1972; Will, 1990: 89). Members of the East Han local staff were actually considered officials (*li*), paid government salaries, and eligible for commissioned posts. Indeed, as the Yinwan records suggest, most members of the commissioned ranks had begun their careers as local appointees in their home areas (Liao, 1998: 25). As such, the local posts controlled by commissioned administrators represented the first step to higher positions within officialdom.

The last reason is the state's weak monitoring capacity (Kiser and Tong, 1992). Administrators had little to fear in terms of harsh sanctions for contravening central mandates or colluding with local interests. Although the Han court devised various measures to strictly limit the authority and power of administrators, the system of monitoring local administration in Han China was arguably weak. Information traveled slowly; thus it was unlikely that crimes or misdemeanors would ever come to light (De Crespigny, 1995: 538; Loewe, 1967: I. 43-44).

Although the monitoring capacity of the Han was far less sophisticated than that of a contemporary nation, it was not as weak as some scholars are willing to assume. Hou (2008) analyzed Han officials' post offices and found their widespread presence, which facilitated the communication between the central and local governments. Thus, even though the number of supervisors was not large, the central government could still retain good control.

While arguments about the weak monitoring capacity of the state may explain illegal forms of local responsiveness or accommodation, they are less illuminating in cases where the administrator was acting in a legitimate fashion. For example, how can the weak monitoring capacity of the state explain cases where Han administrators took special initiatives to provide public goods to constituents, such as sponsoring projects to build or repair roads and temples? Han sources offer numerous examples of this phenomenon, one of which is the monument erected in 148 CE to Yang Huan, the Former Metropolitan Commandant (*sili xiaowei*). According to his eulogist, Yang attempted to improve the welfare of the region by rebuilding a tunnel through mountains that had been destroyed (Harrist, 2008). Another example is the early second-century stone carving commemorating the road that Zhao, a commissioned official, constructed over a dangerous precipice. According to the text of the carving, Zhao's efforts benefited the area as a whole, since the road curbed robberies (*LS* 4.2b-3b). The last example is the eulogy for Ma Leng in *Hou Han Shu* (*HHS* 24. 862; *Dong guan Han ji* 12.10a-10b):

> In the middle of the years of Jianchu, Ma was the vice-administrator of his commandery (*Jungongcao*). After the Empress Ma lost power, the Emperor Suzong promoted Ma as an

[5] Demographic estimates put the figure somewhere between fifty and sixty million souls (Bielenstein, 1947, 1975); Loewe's figure (2004) for the Han bureaucracy is based on the Yinwan findings and traditional sources; he estimates that there were 130,000 officials total in the Han bureaucracy.

official serving in the court. In the first year of Zhanghe, Ma was appointed Governor of Guangling. At that time, food was expensive, and famine spread. Ma appealed to the central government to dismiss the salt supervisor, which benefited the local population. He also supported the poor and the weak, reduced taxes, restored lakes so as to irrigate twenty thousand acres of farmland. Local officials and people engraved the stele to praise him. In the second year of Yongyuan, Ma was transferred to become the Governor of Hanyang.

IV. Ideology

Perhaps it can be argued that administrators like Han Shao saw local responsiveness as a moral imperative. Therefore, it is necessary to examine how the ideology influenced local administrators' ethical values. Han was the dynasty under which Confucius's philosophy began to gain prominence and was first officially sponsored. Yu (2003:50) points out that Confucianism under the Han is different from that in later dynasties. During the Han (even the East Han) period, "heart and mind" (*xinxing* 心性) had not yet "become the core of Confucianism," and "Mencius's ideology had not been established as orthodox." Nylan (2008) also argues that under the Han, the central government did not give Confucianism exclusive patronage. Although in the Han period, Confucianism had not established its orthodox ideology, which were formed in later ages, most scholars at that time believed that the classical tradition required "benevolent governance." This general philosophy enabled administrators to act as microcosms of dynastic authority.

To understand how scholars connect classical notions of political authority with local responsiveness, it is necessary to review contemporary conceptions of political authority. Han conceptions of political authority did not give emperors a *carte blanche* to rule (Loewe, 2004; Nylan, 2008). The ultimate justification for the Emperor's authority was the Mandate of Heaven, which was contingent upon his ability to shepherd the population. As a result, imperial rulers were forced to concede (at least publicly) two points. First, their right and even their ability to govern were contingent upon divine sanction being granted by an anthropomorphic Heaven. Divine sanction, furthermore, was conditional upon the ruler's personal virtue, defined in terms of the ruler's ability to govern effectively and "show himself to be the true 'father and mother' of the people" (Nylan, 2008). Second, the failure to act in such a fashion would result in Heaven rescinding its mandate, making open rebellion and even regicide justifiable. Of course, this view was not without precedent, as some classical texts reminded rulers that they exist not to be served but to serve. As the influential *Mencius* put it, "The people are of supreme importance; the altars to the gods of earth and grain come next; last comes the ruler" (*Mencius*, tr. Lau: 68).

Although such a notion of charismatic authority originally applied to the emperor, some scholars have argued that centrally-appointed administrators also came to see their authority in the same terms (Metzger, 1973: 252). The administrator was not merely a bureaucrat who carried out the will of the emperor or other superiors (Hamilton, 1989: 158). Instead, the administrator served as a microcosm of dynastic authority (Metzger, 1973: 252).

Such notions of political authority had significant consequences for the Chinese imperial system of administration. Given that he could be seen as the emperor writ small, the administrator might have imagined that he was subject to the Mandate of Heaven. His authority, like that of the emperor, was contingent upon acting as the "father and mother" of the people. If, indeed, local service was the sole basis of his authority, then an administrator understandably felt justified in violating rules that interfered with his Heaven-mandated obligations. The contents of stone monuments provide us with concrete examples.

One of the most famous cliff stelae was engraved to memorialize Li Xi (circa 160), the Governor of Wu Du, for leading the local people to renovate Xixia plank road, built along a cliff (*xixia gedao*), and benefiting the people. The inscription says,

> In the commandery's western gorge was a central path, but it was dangerous and full of obstacles. The road and pavilions were built along a steep cliff. High mountains surrounded it, and heavy clouds enshrouded it, while beneath it ran an unfathomable river. The road was narrow and only admitted one cart or one horse carrying a single person. Once on the road, one could neither pass quickly nor rest for a long time. Many accidental falls from cliffs occurred, and all who passed along the road were afraid. Li Xi himself once tried to take this risk and felt as though he had stepped into an abyss. He writes, "*Shijing* describes how birds perch on branches and people stand beside the cliff. How dangerous it is. Such a situation brings difficulty for us. If we do not solve the problem right now, it will lead to no end of harm." Thus, he ordered the laborers to make tools, cut down trees, level high mountains, fill lowlands, and, finally, to flatten and straighten the road. With huge amounts of such work, the road became both stable and wide. One could even walk on it at night. People from all around came to see the project, and passengers celebrate its success. The local population is grateful for Li Xi's benevolence like a fresh breeze.

Why do we assert that Li Xi was exercising his political authority in serving the local community? First, renovation of the Xixia plank road was Li Xi's decision rather than the emperor's. Second, the motivation for starting the project was provided by the hardship of the local population ("Many accidental falls from cliffs occurred, and all who passed along the road were afraid."). Finally, we notice that it was ordinary travelers and the public who praised Li Xi's conduct ("People from all around came to see the project, and passengers celebrate its success. The local population is grateful for Li Xi's benevolence like a fresh breeze.").

Scrutinizing the inscriptions on the stone monuments in the East Han, we found that the authors of these inscriptions put effort into judging the administrators' virtues. They also emphasized that the administrators had received recognition from the local populations. Of course, the inscriptions were designed to extol individuals. Some of the authors even emphasized recognition from the Heaven as an indisputable proof of divinity. The monument to memorialize Kong Zhou (died in circa 168 CE), the administrator of Beihai, exemplifies this. The author of this inscription emphasized Kong Zhou's role as a Heaven-mandated leader in the local community who was able to make fertile fields out of barren wastelands. The inscription says that Zhou's subordinates could grow food and make wine on former wasteland (*KSS*, II.148). Another example was the monument for Zhang Shou, the administrator of Zhuyi (died in circa 168 CE). It reveals a clear awareness of the fact that superiors were on the look-out for reports of portents of disaster. Not only did Zhang show himself to be a true father and mother of the people—acts that won him the love and admiration of the commoners—he also exhibited considerable power over nature. He was so virtuous that the "territory did not have portents of disaster and the yield for the year was bountiful" (*KSS*, II, p.166). Another example is the temple for Lu Gong, a magistrate in Zhongmou commandery (32-112 CE). According to *Hou Han Shu*, the temple dedicated to Lu by his local constituents and colleagues recorded the auspicious portents associated with Lu's governance. For example, we learn that not only was his territory spared during a plague of locusts that inflicted the area in 82 CE and free of snakes, but auspicious grain also grew in Lu's place of residence (*HHS* 25. 873; De Crespigny, 2006:615-616).

We then conducted basic statistical analyses of the stelae's contents. Based on their contents, we divided all stelae into four categories: first, those that emphasize service to the dynasty or

dynastic recognition; second, those that highlight service to the local population or recognition from the local population; third, those that stress political disengagement; and fourth, those that have no discernible message (for the most part, stelae that fall into the fourth category are highly fragmentary). One aspect of this four-part coding scheme deserves note: the four categories are not necessarily discrete, as a handful of stelae mention both imperial recognition and local service. Therefore, we have categorized stelae according to what values were *emphasized* most by the eulogist. In addition, we have erred on the side of caution: in the few cases in which it is unclear whether service to the dynasty or service to the local population is emphasized, we placed the inscription in the category of "Dynastic Service." By analyzing the stelae in this way, we find that 145 of the stele monuments have some kind of discernible message. Of these, 51 focus on a man's service to the dynastic court, whereas 94 celebrate his ties to the population. More strikingly, all but a small handful of the monuments that celebrate ties to the population extol service in an area that an administrator governed, rather than in his own native community.

The works of Han social commentators, moreover, lend support to the view that officials saw local service as a moral imperative. For example, the scholar-official, Cui Shi complained about the *junxian* system in his *Discussion of Governance* (*Zhenglun*), arguing that its system of rotating administrators rapidly through different posts around the empire discouraged them from serving the people under their jurisdiction well. Although Cui recognized the impracticality of abolishing the *junxian* system altogether, he proposed extending the stay of administrators to several decades so as to allow them to become rooted in the communities they served (Yan Kejun, 1963: vol. 46, 7a). By Cui's account, doing so would allow the administrator to identify personally with local interests and better serve the population under his charge. Cui's discussion captures many of the sentiments found in stele monuments: administrators should not only be concerned with the welfare of the population, they should also become an integral part of the communities they administer.

Our foregoing discussion has revealed that local responsiveness was construed as a moral obligation. Yu Yingshi pointed out that a good administrator's responsibility toward the local population is actually in accordance with the teachings of *the Analects of Confucius* (*lunyu*) (2003: 86-89). However, Yu's analysis did not illustrate how Confucianism influenced local officials' values. In addition, he found that the number of officials advocating Confucian ideas then was much smaller than that of their opponents -- i.e., oppressive officials (*kuli*) and vulgar officials (*suli*). But how were Han officials inculcated with such values in favor of local interests? Clearly, such norms could not have been the byproduct of a classical education in the case of most Han administrators. As mentioned above, in contrast to the situation in late imperial China, no regular examination system was in place during the Han period. In effect, this meant that Han administrators, unlike their counterparts in late imperial China, underwent no long training period during which they could be inculcated with classical ideology. It is true that a small handful of the most famous scholars of the age acquired positions based on examinations during the Han. And it is also true that the most senior ministers were highly literate. Yet, it was rare for a minister or an official to be awarded an office purely on the basis of his command of the classics during the Han (Loewe, 2004: 128-129; Houn, 1966:. 149-51; Nylan, 2000: 238). More problematic is the fact that many Han administrators were not highly literate, let alone thoroughly versed in the classics (Nylan, 1996: 11, 12-15; Nylan, 2000: 238; Houn, 1966: 159). In addition, as different explanations of the Mandate of Heaven existed inside the East Han court, this could not be disseminated as an impeccable ideology (Clark, 2008).

V. Reputational Mechanisms

As we have seen, local responsiveness on the part of centrally-appointed officials has been explained in terms of practical necessity or adherence to classical norms. However, both types of explanations suffer from limitations for the Han case. Arguments about practical necessity, for example, fail to illuminate the agency of local responsiveness, while accounts that stress values cannot explain how Han administrators acquired norms emphasizing local responsiveness. To understand why imperial officials responded to the expectation that they be locally responsive, we propose an explanation –the role of reputational mechanisms. As will be shown below, the Han system of selection and promotion made it in the interest of administrators and their families to accommodate their most powerful local constituents and colleagues in exchange for public recognition of their virtue.

The Han system of administrator recruitment and promotion was the Recommendation System (*chajuzhi* 察举制). Extraordinary virtue was a *formal* criterion for selection and promotion. The purpose of the Recommendation System was to select scholars with good virtue. They are "filial sons at home and incorrupt officials once they have stepped into officialdom." The main criteria of the Recommendation System were filial piety and incorruption. Every year, each commandery recommended one to two persons (depended on the population) as "Filial and Incorrupt" (*xiaolian*). But virtue is difficult to measure objectively. Therefore, proof of extraordinary personal sanctity – as evidenced by "going beyond the rites" or being associated with miracles – became a standard pretext for recruiting a man into the ranks of officialdom (Brown, 2007: 46, 80-81).

Calls for the virtuous amounted to more than rhetoric; proof of virtue was treated by senior officials as a prerequisite for appointment. Administrators were required to investigate reputations for personal sanctity, particularly "filial piety," before making official appointments (Brown, 2007: 52). In this connection, consider a memo used to recommend a thirteen-year-old clerk named Cheng Wei to the commissioned ranks. Its author is the aforementioned Cai Yong, who was a writer and calligrapher in East Han, as well as the left commandant of the emperor's bodyguards (*zuozhonglangjiang*) during Hanxian Di (汉献帝时任左中郎将). In this letter, Cai Yong does not mention Cheng's technical skills—his mastery of reading and writing or his knowledge of legal and administrative matters. Instead, Cai only emphasized Cheng's personal sanctity—those things that cannot be "learned" or "taught" but only "tested" (Weber, 1947: 367). This emphasis is seen by the space given to describing Cheng's "outstanding filial conduct" while in mourning for his great-uncle. According to Cai, Cheng was so moved with grief, he became distracted and emaciated. "Whenever the name of his uncle fell upon his ears," Cai wrote, "Cheng's eyes would respond with tears." In addition, Cai went to great lengths to verify Cheng's sanctity; he interviewed eyewitnesses and devised various ruses to put the sincerity of the boy's grief to the test. Cai argued that Cheng's "outstanding filial piety" was the product of innate virtue, rather than education or upbringing. Pointing to Cheng's rustic background, Cai argued that the boy's conduct sprung from his natural dispositions and thus made him all the more qualified for office. As Cai put it, "Even men of mature years who are cultivated gentlemen, who conduct themselves in accordance with ritual propriety, and who are aware of their moral duties – none of them can rival this boy" (*CZLJ* [wai] vol. 8, 4a-5a).

Just as demonstrations of virtue furnished proof of an administrator's fitness to rule; evidence of the lack of virtue served as grounds for disqualification or removal. Assessments of the lack of virtue followed the same logic of dynastic legitimacy. Bountiful harvests and general prosperity were signs of Heaven's approval of not only the emperor, but also the administrator as

well. Conversely, misfortunes—droughts, floods, famines, or other astrological portents—provided evidence that the emperor or administrator was lacking in the requisite charismatic virtue (Weber, 1947: 360; Eberhard, 1957; McKnight, 1981: 18-36; Loewe, 2004: 442-456). Such a system of assessment was institutionalized and incorporated into the regular evaluation of administrators. According to the *Han Protocols* (*Han yi*) of Cai Zhi (fl. 178 CE), inspectors dispatched by the imperial court to monitor governors were to watch for signs of Heavenly disapproval, such as "mountains collapsing, stones splitting, and bad omens" (*HHS* 128.3617-3618). Such disturbances, furthermore, were to be reported back to the central authorities and used as grounds for removing and trying a governor (De Crespigny, 1981: 49).

This emphasis on virtue also gave members of the local elite leverage over the administrator, since they were able to enhance his reputation for virtue by building public monuments. At least three kinds of monuments were erected for administrators in Han times: the aforementioned stelae, temples (*miao*), and shrines (*ci*). Stelae originated in the second century, while temples and shrines date back to even earlier, around the first century. They were erected largely on the initiative of local officials and locally powerful men with no official positions. Table 1 shows that among the 1677 donors of the 48 donor lists in our study, 229 were commissioned officials and 552 were locally appointed officials. The rest of the donors were locally powerful men with no official position (Brown, 2007). Table 2 shows the known temples and shrines for commissioned officials in East Han. There are 32 temples and shrines in total, and at least eight of them were built for officials who were still alive then.

Table 2

Additionally, local elites also compose hymns (songs or gesong) to extol the local administrator. Different from stelae, temples and shrines, which have material existence, the existence of hymns of praise relies on their being widely sung and memorized by the people. A hymn may thus have a larger impact than a monument, as its existence is not limited by geography . As with stelae, temples and shrines, the origin of hymns is difficult to verify. Their authors are generally thought to be local people, including local officials (“百姓”、“民”、“吏民”、“吏”) in historical documents. Table 3 shows the hymns extolling the commissioned officials in East Han.

Table 3

The power of monuments and hymns to enhance a reputation becomes clear through a comparison of monuments with official dossiers. Secretly housed in the imperial library, official dossiers were hardly read by the emperor (Nylan, 2000: 240-241). Besides, dynastic histories did not circulate widely among the general public. Most of the contents in *Historical Records* (*Shiji*) (ca. 90 BCE) were enclosed during the Eastern Han period (Hulsewé, 1975: 87). In contrast, stone monuments were public. Consider, for example, the placement of stelae. Found alongside of roads, in front of temples and tombs, and on the faces of bridges and sides of mountains, such monuments were designed to be seen, sung, and memorized by members of the population and travelers, as well as future administrators (Brashier, 2005; Harrist, 2008). "Ah, generations to come," the eulogist noted, "This is your standard, your model" (*CZLJ* 2.2b). Similarly, another eulogist insisted that his stele would no less than "clearly instruct future brothers; extending and bestowing a mirror for reflection" (*KSS*, I: 192).

Much has been said about why the prospects of being commemorated in a monument would have motivated administrators, but what evidence exists that such monuments did in fact facilitate promotions? To begin with, dynastic histories (which were based on official dossiers) mentioned commemorative stelae, temples, and shrines in the biographies of officials; thus, it is clear that the superiors of administrators incorporated such information into performance evaluations.[6] Additionally, several cases suggest that conspicuous forms of local recognition could become a factor in a subsequent promotion. Consider the case of two brothers, who were recognized in stelae. The elder brother, Dong Hui (fl. 177 CE), had been the magistrate of Buqi county, where his administration appears to have been well received. As a result, Dong Hui was subsequently nominated by his superiors in the province of Qingzhou for his "Exceptional Conduct" (*youyi*) and soon promoted to the position of Governor of Danyang, but following this he died suddenly of disease (*HHS* 66.2482). In the case of the younger brother, Dong Yi, the biographer suggests that a monument was a contributing factor in his promotion. While Dong Yi was the head of a county in Dongping, a stele was erected for him by a group of local donors. Dong Yi subsequently left office to wear mourning, probably for a relative, but he later received a prestigious nomination for office (*HHS* 76.2482). The nomination would have undoubtedly translated into a promotion had Dong Yi accepted it.[7] Temples and shrines also aided the administrator in his quest for a virtuous reputation. Two cases should make this clear. In the case of the aforementioned Lu Gong, the public recognition he received in Zhongmou facilitated later promotions. After serving there, he left office to wear mourning for his mother (as was customary); when his period of mourning ended, he was reappointed as a censor and subsequently made Minister over the Masses. The case of Zhang Huan (104-181), who had served as the administrator of Wuwei, also reveals the power of temple dedications. There, local notables erected temples and shrines on his behalf. Zhang subsequently received a nomination for his "Exceptional Conduct," the timing of which suggests that the monuments enhanced his standing with superiors (*HHS* 65. 2138-2144; De Crespigny, 2006: 1052-1053).

Our discussion thus far has focused on the positive incentives that the local population offered administrators as individuals. Yet it is important to bear in mind the role that familial identifications play in rational calculations of self-interest (Adams 1999). Thus, we propose the following question: To what extent did public recognition, in monuments and other forms, benefit the kinship groups of the praised?

We believe that at the very least, the public recognition received by an administrator enhanced the social standing of his family, as evidenced by the fact that any of the monuments (particularly postmortem stelae) were erected in the administrator's home area, instead of the areas where he governed.[8] Such monuments should be seen as forms of display in public, which, furthermore, did not merely reflect the existing power or status of a single individual but also that of the larger kinship group (Nylan, 2005b: 28-37).

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[6] For information about the relationship between official dossiers and dynastic histories, see Brown (2007). For inscriptions mentioned in dynastic histories, see *HHS* (38.1606, 52.2063, 52.2067, 58.2227, and 72.2794). For references to inscribed stones (not stelae), see *HHS* (24.862, 43.1487, 43.1750). For a shrine dedicated to a deceased Governor, see *HHS* (71.2676). For temples and shrines, see *HHS* (31.1105-06; 41.1413; 42.1453; 56.1819; 62.2049).

[7] For an analogous case, see *HHS* 86.2851 and refer to the Chief Commandant of Guanghan, Zheng Chun).

[8] For examples of funerary stelae erected by former local constituents and colleagues for the administrator, which were erected in the administrator's home area, see the cases of Kong Zhou (*LS* 6.5b), Kong Biao (*KSS* II.192; *LS* 8.16b), Zheng Jixuan (*LX* 19.6b), and Liu Kuan (*LS* 11.4a; *LX* 12.5b).

In summary, we propose that the system of recruitment and promotion, which stressed virtuous reputations, motivated administrators like Han Shao to serve local interests. As seen above, Han local elites had the power to shape the reputations of administrators by building monuments and composing hymns. Reputations, furthermore, mattered because of the system of official recruitment at the time. In an age in which there were no hard and fast qualifications for office, the reputation of a man among his peers and contemporaries was not only crucial for securing a post for himself, but also potentially useful for helping his relatives get a foothold into officialdom.

VI. Discussion and Conclusion

Why were centrally appointed administrators locally responsive in Han times? And why did they sometimes privilege the interests of their local constituents and colleagues over the prerogatives of their superiors? We argue that such actions reveal the existence of "dual accountability," an institutional position that made administrators beholden to and dependent upon their powerful local constituents and colleagues, as well as their superiors. To explain the existence of such a phenomenon, we marshal historical evidence from Han China and propose three explanations: practical necessity, which relates to the structure of the government; ideology, which relates to the political thoughts and ethical values of the administrators; and reputation mechanism, which relates to the Han system of recruitment and promotion.

Let us now turn to our original question: how was an immense empire governed effectively by a small state with primitive methods of communication? A lot depends on what is meant by effective. If by effective, we mean an efficient, centralist political organization – in other words, an organization designed to implement central directives down a chain of command - then the Han system of recruitment certainly fell short of achieving such goals. In fact, this system serves as a prime example of what Weber referred to as inefficiency, as it eschewed specialists in favor of the cultivated man and thus did not foster rationality or the "domination by means of knowledge" (Ringer, 2004: 184). Instead, the goal was to recruit men who had achieved "a quality of life conduct which was held to be 'cultivated'" (Weber, 1978: 278, 1001). Indeed, our findings show that reputational mechanisms only worked *against* efforts to insulate officials from undue local influence and corruption. The ancient Chinese bureaucratic system's emphasis on reputation made the implementation of central orders more difficult at the local level, since it encouraged administrators to defend local interests.

In fact, our foregoing discussion largely confirms that Hamilton and Shue were correct in arguing that the primary goal for imperial rulers was not to create an efficient power structure, but rather to maintain stability and the status quo by regulation (Hamilton, 1989: 162). If indeed stability was the goal, then the emphasis on virtue makes sense. There is often a tradeoff between efficiency and stability (Tarrow, 1977; Scott, 1998). Systems of governance that implement central directives too efficiently are vulnerable to social unrest because there is less room for local accommodation. Seen from this light, the East Han system of recruitment was effective in fostering stability; by taking into consideration local reputations, it encouraged local responsiveness and thus provided political stability. In addition, the East Han system helped strengthen the court's claim as the legitimate ruler of a vast but unified state by encouraging administrators to present the court as a benevolent "father and mother of the people."

More generally, our findings suggest two broader implications of the Weberian thesis. First, although Weber acknowledged the existence of charismatic elements in conceptions of imperial

power, he tended to see the authority of Chinese rulers as traditional or patrimonial. In contrast, our findings reveal that the imperial system incorporated charismatic bases of authority. This is best exemplified by the Han system of recruitment and promotion, which made proof of exemplary sanctity the main criterion for selection. The second implication has to do with Weber's assumption that charismatic authority is somehow intrinsically incompatible with stable organizations, which Weber thought could only be based on either rational (i.e., legal) or traditional modes of authority (Weber, 1978: 246-254). Our findings reveal that charismatic modes of authority were far from incompatible with bureaucratic organization. On the contrary, such modes of authority were embedded in the system of recruitment and promotion for centuries in imperial China. They fostered stability by facilitating local responsiveness and forestalling organized resistance to central authority.

To what extent do our findings hold for other periods of Chinese history? Was the East Han, in other words, something of an anomaly in that administrators were unusually accountable to their constituents? The question must be asked, since the Chinese bureaucracy was transformed not once but several times over the next two millennia. To name the most important change, administrators in late imperial China were selected not for their reputations, but rather for passing examinations (Ch'ü, [1962]1988; Watt, 1972). This development raises the question of whether the relationship between administrators and their local constituents had changed, as political theorist Gu Yanwu (1969) once suggested. If official appointment was less dependent on local recognition in late imperial China, were administrators less reliant on – and hence less accountable – to the population?

Answering this question lies beyond the scope of this paper. However, we can briefly refer to the case of an early Qing magistrate, Yu Sen, which suggests that there was, in fact, local accountability in late imperial China. In the thirtieth year of Kangxi (1691)（康熙三十年）, Shan Xi province, which is adjacent to Hu Bei province, suffered from natural disasters, and many refugees moved to Yun Yang and Xiang Yang, which lies in the northwest of Hu Bei. Yu Sen, an official in charge of Hu Bei and Hu Nan (湖广布政司参议、郧襄道道员) faced a terrible dilemma: he could illegally open the granaries, on the one hand or wait several months for proper authorization from Beijing, on the other. The former choice would allow him to save scores of starving people but incur dynastic sanctions; the latter would save his career but lead to the deaths of countless children and adults. Faced with these choices, he decided to open the granaries. Afterwards, he forwarded a memorial to the court, retroactively appealing for three months of famine relief. In his official communications, he wrote that he had undertaken this course of action with full knowledge that he was in violation of protocol (Will, 1990: 93).

The parallels between this episode and that of Han Shao, spaced fifteen centuries apart, reveal that administrators of imperial China generally felt accountable not only to those above but also to those below. We cautiously propose that the three factors we listed -- practical necessity, ideology and reputational mechanisms -- have existed for a long time in Chinese history. Perhaps even in contemporary China, dual accountability characterizes an important *structural* position of mid-level officials. We noticed that reputational mechanisms continued to play a key role in fostering dual accountability in later periods of Chinese history, particularly after the establishment of the examination system. As was the case with their East Han ancestors, local and political elites of the Song, Ming, and Qing Dynasties erected shrines, temples, and stelaes to centrally appointed officials for their contributions locally and their exemplary virtue (Neskar, 1993; Will, 1990: 93). Indeed, evidence exists that reputational mechanisms continue to exert influence on the political culture of contemporary Chinese politics (Shirk, 1982: 7-23; Tsai,

2007).[9] Yet, since East Han, the dramatic transformations in political system, economy, technology, and cultural norms over two millennia mean that the concrete ways in which reputational mechanisms work to reinforce dual accountability have changed. As a result, we await future work to illuminate what those mechanisms are and to enhance our understanding of China in general.

[9] Drawing upon her own extensive research on village-level government in contemporary China, Tsai (2007) shows that official accountability owes much to the existence of local solidarity groups, which incorporate officials. Such groups – which include temples, clans, and fraternal organizations make officials accountable by awarding them with prestige or moral standing in exchange for local responsiveness. Tsai, however, leaves open the question of whether informal institutions of local accountability provided by solidarity groups exist at higher levels of administration – and even suggests that they are only effective at the village level (Tsai, 2007: 371).

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Table 1 statistical analysis of stele inscriptions donors

Name of the stele inscriptions	Total number of the donors	Number of centrally-appointed administrators	Number of sub-bureaucrats
白石神君碑	22	4	16
巴郡太守張納碑	50	2	48
北海相景君碑	53	0	52
博陵太守孔彪碑	13	3	10
蒼頡廟碑	27	6	21
成陽靈臺碑	33	9	15
蕩陰令張遷碑	41	3	5
帝堯碑	7	6	1
敦煌長史武斑（班）碑	4	4	0
都鄉孝子嚴舉碑	33	2	9
繁陽令楊君碑	121	1	85
馮煥殘碑	8	0	8
封丘令王元賓碑	4	0	0
高陽令楊著碑	46	0	0
韓勅碑	106	19	19
郃陽曹全碑	53	0	49
吉成侯州輔碑	46	30	10
冀州刺史王純碑	193	0	0
涼州刺史魏元丕碑	12	10	0
劉寬後碑	162	67	9
溧陽長潘乾校官碑	13	3	10
婁壽碑	31	1	16
南陽太守秦頡碑	8	0	2
沛相楊統碑	15	3	5
祀三公山碑	4	3	1
司空宗俱碑	33	0	0
司隸校尉魯峻碑	40	0	4
嵩山開母廟石闕銘	9	3	6
嵩山少室石闕銘	11	6	5
酸棗令劉熊碑殘石	71	11	59
泰山都尉孔宙碑	56	0	0
太尉楊震碑	172	1	0
堂邑令費鳳碑	8	0	4
童子逢盛 碑	11	0	7
尉氏令鄭季宣碑	25	2	19
武都太守李翕西狹頌	13	3	8
無極山碑	2	2	0
仙人唐公房碑	16	4	5
鮮于璜碑	5	2	3
西嶽華山廟碑	7	4	3

西嶽華山亭碑	10	4	6
陽嘉殘碑	12	0	11
謁者景君墓表	16	0	0
益州太守無名碑	3	0	3
趙相雍勸闕碑	5	5	0
趙儀碑	8	2	6
中部碑	9	0	9
周憬功勛碑	30	4	3
Total	1677	229	552

Table 2 Temples and Shrines for Commissioned Officials in East Han

Name of the Official	Years	Resource	If Built after Death
1.Chen Zhong	fl. circa 30 AD	*HHS* 12.501; De Crespigny, *Biographical Dictionary: 83.*	No
2.Cen Peng	Died in circa 35 AD	后汉纪6.166.	Not sure
3.Gao Huo	fl. circa 20-40 AD	*HHS* 82.2711; De Crespigny, *Biographical Dictionary: 242.*	Yes
4.Deng Xun	36-92 AD	*Dong guan Han ji*: 8.4b.	Yes
5.Hou Ba	Died in circa 37 AD	*HHS* 26.902; De Crespigny, *Biographical Dictionary*: 321.	Yes
6. Jia Biao	fl. circa 169 AD	七家后汉书（谢承）4.9a-b; 水经注碑录 8/34; De Crespigny, *Biographical Dictionary*: 363.	Yes
7. Jiang Shi	fl. circa 60 AD	*HHS* 84/74.2783-84, *HYGZ* 10B.148; De Crespigny, *Biographical Dictionary*: 377.	Not sure
8. Li Gang	172 AD	*De Crespigny, Biographical Dictionary:* 412.	Yes
9. Lu Gong	32-112 AD	LS 20.4b-5a; De Crespigny, *Biographical Dictionary*: 616.	No
10. Luo Heng	2CE	华阳国志 10A.136; De Crespigny, *Biographical Dictionary*: 632.	Not sure
11. Ren Yan	5-68 AD	*HHS* 76.2462; De Crespigny, *Biographical Dictionary*: 721.	No
12. Zhao Xinchen	Died in circa 31 BC	汉书 89.3643; Loewe, *Biographical Dictionary:* 467-468.	Not sure
13. Song Deng	fl. circa 125-144 AD	后汉书 79A.2557; De Crespigny, *Biographical Dictionary*: 752.	Yes
14. Wang Zixiang	Died in circa 106 AD	水经注碑录 10.404; De Crespigny, *Biographical Dictionary*: 845.	Yes
15. Wang Huan	Died in circa 106 AD 105	*HHS* 76.2469; De Crespigny, *Biographical Dictionary*; 817.	Yes
16.Wang Ji	Died in circa 106 AD 179	*HHS* 27.1258	Yes
17. Wang Tang	fl. circa 127 AD	*HHS* 31.1105; De Crespigny, *Biographical Dictionary*: 833.	No
18. Wei Yi	fl. circa 140AD	*HHS* 26.921; De Crespigny, *Biographical Dictionary*: 858.	No
19. Wen Qi	Died in circa 106 AD 37	*HHS* 86.2846; De Crespigny, *Biographical Dictionary*: 863.	Yes
20. Wen Weng	2 CE BC	汉书 89.3627; Loewe, *Biographical Dictionary*: 582.	Yes
21. Xu Jing	fl. circa 106-125 AD	*HHS* 76.2472; De Crespigny, *Biographical Dictionary*: 906.	Yes

22. Xu Yang	fl. circa 23AD	*HHS* 82A.2711; De Crespigny, *Biographical Dictionary*: 915.	Yes
23. Xun Shu	83-149AD or *c.*100-*c.*167	*HHS* 65.2049; De Crespigny, *Biographical Dictionary*: 927.	Yes
24. Yang Hou	72-153 AD	*HHS* 30.1050; De Crespigny, *Biographical Dictionary*: 952.	Yes
25. Yu Gong	Died in circa 43 BC 43	汉 书 71.3041; Loewe, *Biographical Dictionary*: 660.	No
26. Zhai Tong	Died in circa 106 AD 73	*HHS* 20.744-46; De Crespigny, *Biographical Dictionary*: 1030.	Yes
27. Zhang Huan	104-181 AD	*HHS* 65.2139; De Crespigny, *Biographical Dictionary*: 1054.	No
28. Zhao Bing		*HHS* 82.2742; De Crespigny, *Biographical Dictionary*: 1095.	Yes
29. Zhou Jia	fl. circa 20s AD	*HHS* 81.2676; De Crespigny, *Biographical Dictionary*: 1142.	Yes
30. Zhu Yi	Died in circa 61 BC	汉 书 89.3637; Loewe, *Biographical Dictionary:* 742-43.	Yes
31. Zhu Zun	Died in circa 24 AD	华阳国志 10B.15; De Crespigny, *Biographical Dictionary*: 1171.	Yes
32. Zhuo Mao	Died in circa 28 AD	*De Crespigny, Biographical Dictionary:* 1173.	No

Table 3 Hymns Extolling the Commissioned Officials in East Han

Name of the Official	Years	Resource
1. Peng Xiu	1 CE AD	七家后汉书（谢承） 5
2. Dong Zhong	fl. circa 177AD	七家后汉书（谢承） 5
3. Bao Jishou		七家后汉书（谢承） 8
		HHS 71.2302;
4. Huang Fusong	fl. circa 180-188AD	七家后汉书（谢承） 4
5. Cen Peng	Died in circa 35 AD	*HHS* 17.663
6. Chen Jun	Died in circa 47 AD	*HHS* 18.691
7. Guo He	Died in circa 64AD	*HHS* 26.908
8. Zhao Xun		*HHS* 26.914
9. Zhang Kan	fl. circa 25-36AD	*HHS* 31.1100
10. Lian Fan	Died in circa 90 AD	*HHS* 31.1103
11. Jia Cong	fl. circa 184-189AD	*HHS* 31.1111
12. Song Jun	fl. circa 106-121AD	*HHS* 41.1413
13. Zhu Hui	12-88 ad	*HHS* 43. 1459
14. He Chang	fl. circa 86-105AD	*HHS* 43.1482
15. Cui Yuan	77/78-142/143 AD	*HHS* 52.1724
16. Liu Tao	Died in circa 185 AD	*HHS* 57.1848
17. Liu Yu	Died in circa 193 AD	*HHS* 73.2353
18. Wang Huan	Died in circa 105 AD	*HHS* 76.2469
19. Tong Hui	fl. circa177AD	*HHS* 76.2482
20. Fan Ye	Died in circa 50 AD	*HHS* 77.2491
21. Fan Ran	112-185 AD	*HHS* 81.2689
22. Zheng Chun		*HHS* 86.2851
23. Zhang Huan	104-181 AD	后汉纪 23（二年）
24. Zhao Xi	3 BC-80 AD	后汉纪 8（27 年）
25. Xiao He	Died in circa 193 BC	汉书 39.2021
26. Han Anguo	Died in circa 127BC	汉书 52.2400
27. Zhao Guanghan	Died in circa 66-64 BC	汉书 76.3206
28. Feng Li	fl. circa 33BC	汉书 79. 3305
29. Shi Xian	Died in circa 124 BC	汉书 93.3727