@article{34031,
  author = {Miranda Brown and Yu Xie},
  title = {Between heaven and earth: Dual accountability in Han China},
  abstract = { <p>Scholars have noticed that centrally-appointed officials in imperial China were not only~beholden to their superiors but also acted as brokers of local interests.We characterize~such a structural position as {\textquoteleft}dual accountability{\textquoteright}. Although accountability to superiors is~readily understandable within the Weberian framework of bureaucratic hierarchy, the~reasons behind local responsiveness bear explanation. This paper attempts to explain~such responsiveness by investigating the larger ideological, structural, and institutional~contexts of the Han dynasty (206 BCE{\textendash}220 CE). We explore two existing explanations<br>{\textendash} practical necessity and {\textquoteleft}Confucian{\textquoteright} or classical paternalism {\textendash} and add a new explanation~of our own: the emphasis on virtuous reputations in the system of bureaucratic~recruitment and promotion. Our argument is supported by empirical evidence from a~range of sources, including administrative records and inscriptions on ancient stelae.<br>More generally, we question Weber{\textquoteright}s hypothesis that the Chinese imperial system of~administration fit the ideal type of traditional bureaucracy, and we examine the rational~bases underlying an {\textquoteleft}inefficient{\textquoteright} system that was in place for two millennia.</p> },
  year = {2015},
  journal = {Chinese Journal of Sociology},
  volume = {1},
  pages = {56-87},
  language = {eng},
}